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NOTES
CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS WHEN
ONE TORTFEASOR ENJOYS A SPECIAL DEFENSE
AGAINST ACTION BY THE INJURED PARTY
Both in-theory and by historical development the doctrine of contribution is
an equitable one.1 The common law denied any right to contribution among
joint tortfeasors, holding that each was fully liable to the plaintiff for all the harm
caused.2 A man whose injury resulted from the acts of two equally culpable
offenders could-by chance, whim, or design-recover full damages from either,
leaving the other free from any legal obligation to his joint tortfeasor or to the
victim. But as the number of tort actions based on negligence increased so as to
greatly outnumber suits concerning intentional torts, which involve a greater
element of moral turpitude, this doctrine was reexamined.3 The inequality of
allowing the full burden of loss, for which two or more persons are equally
responsible, to be borne by one alone has led more than half of the American
jurisdictions, by statute or judicial decision, to allow contribution among joint
tortfeasors.4
Special Defenses in Contribution Suits
A tortfeasor may escape liability to the injured plaintiff if he enjoys a special
defense. For example, he may be the plaintiff's spouse and thus have the defense
of interspousal immunity, or the plaintiff may have been contributorily negligent,
or the action may be barred by the statute of limitations.5 In such cases, the
joint tortfeasor who does not enjoy such a defense remains liable to an action by
the plaintiff even though he is no more culpable than the tortfeasor with the
special defense. The issue then is raised whether such a defense should also bar
a suit for contribution against the tortfeasor who enjoys immunity to suit by the
plaintiff. The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions has held that no right to
contribution can exist without common liability to the plaintiff.6 There must be
1 Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 167 F. Supp. 345, 351-52 (W.D. Pa. 1958); Bulkeley
v. House, 62 Conn. 459, 467-68, 26 Atl. 352, 353 (1893); Anstine v. Pennsylvania R.R., 352
Pa. 547, 549, 43 A.2d 109, 110 (1945); Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 71, 186
A.2d 427, 429 (1962); 13 Am. Jur. "Contribution" § 4 (1938). See also Missouri Dist. Tel.
Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 338 Mo. 692, 702, 93 S.W.2d 19, 22 (1935).
2 Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799); see Leflar, "Con-
tribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors," 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 130 (1932).
3 Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 810, 77 N.W.2d 23, 29 (1956); Ellis v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 403-10, 167 N.W. 1048, 1051-54 (1918).
4 See Note, 68 Yale L.J. 964, 981-82 (1959).
5 See notes 8-44 infra and accompanying text (interspousal immunity); notes 47-51 infra
and accompanying text (contributory negligence); notes 56-60 infra and accompanying
text (statute of limitations).
6 E.g., Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (interspousal immunity).
Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328 (1951) (indemnity action denied because of
charitable immunity). Oahu Ry. & Land Co. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 707 (D.C.
Hawaii 1947) (governmental immunity). Lutz v. Boltz, 48 Del. 197, 100 A.2d 647 (Super.
Ct. 1953) (guest statute). Saxby v. Cadigen, 266 Wis. 391, 63 N.W.2d 820 (1954) (assumption
of risk). Kennedy v. Pennsylvania R.R., 282 F.2d 705 (3d Cir. 1960); Panichella v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 167 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1958); Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 268 Wis. 6, 66 N.W.2d 697 (1954) (contributory negligence). Iowa Power &
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an enforceable right of action by the injured party against each of the tort-
feasors.7
Policies necessarily conflict whenever contribution is sought from a defendant
who is immune to direct action by the injured party, and anomalous results often
follow. If contribution is allowed, the injured plaintiff will recover one-half his
damages from a defendant against whom he could not have recovered at all had
that defendant been the only one at fault. On the bther hand, if contribution is
denied, the first defendant must bear the entire burden of the loss despite the
policy which led to the adoption of the rule of contribution.
Interspousal Immunity
A policy conflict most commonly arises in cases where the injured party is the
spouse of one of the negligent tortfeasors. Four years ago, only Pennsylvania
allowed contribution when one offender enjoyed the defense of interspousal im-
munity.8 But that state has since been joined by Maine,9 Louisiana,10 and
Rhode Island" in a growing dissent to the absolute requirement of common
liability as a prerequisite to contribution.
Pennsylvania: The Original Dissenter. Pennsylvania passed its first contribu-
tion statute in 193912 and thereby expanded the holding of a 1928 case, which
had allowed contribution among joint tortfeasors for unintentional torts, 13 to
include all torts. Subsequently, the leading case of Fisher v. Diehl14 allowed
joining of the husband as a second defendant in an action brought by his wife.
The wife was a passenger in a car driven by her husband and was injured in an
accident in which both her husband and the other driver were negligent. The
court held, under the 1939 statute, that the husband could be joined as
defendant, provided that any judgment against him could not be enforced by his
wife. That judgment was to be available only to the first defendant for purposes
of contribution and, upon payment of the primary judgment, the first defendant
was entitled to utilize it to enforce contribution from the husband.
The husband claimed that this holding was contrary to the Pennsylvania
policy of the legal unity of husband and wife, which emphasizes the need to
Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 144 N.W.2d 303, 306-11 (Iowa 1966); Congressional Country
Club, Inc. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 194 Md. 533, 71 A.2d 696 (1950) (workmen's compensa-
tion). McKay v. Citizens Rapid Transit Co., 190 Va. 851, 59 S.E.2d 121 (1950) (statute of
limitations); see Restatement, Restitution § 86 (1937).
7 The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides that "where two or more
persons become jointly or severally liable in tort . . . there is a right of contribution among
them." Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 1(a), 1955 Revised Act, 9 Unif. Laws.
Ann. (Supp. 1965, at 125). The Commissioners' Note comments:
The language used has been adequate to exclude cases where the person from whom
contribution is sought was not liable to the injured person. Thus where the potential
contributor is the spouse of the injured person.... Or where the injured person assumed
the risk of the potential contributor's negligence [sic].
9 U.L.A. (Supp. 1965, at 126).
8 Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1945).
9 Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963).
10 Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965).
11 Zarrella v. Miller, 217 A.2d 673 (R.I. 1966).
12 "Contribution shall be enforceable among those who are jointly or severally liable
for a tort where, as between them, such liabilities are either all primary or all secondary."
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2081 (1951).
13 Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 Atl. 231 (1928).
14 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1945).
[Vol. 52
preserve domestic peace and felicity. The court found, however, that the action
was not one of wife against husband, since any judgment in favor of the wife
could not be enforced against the husband. The court noted that:
The legal unity of husband and wife and the preservation of domestic
peace and felicity between them are desirable things to maintain ... where
they do not inflict injustice upon outsiders and deprive them of their legal
rights.
.... To hold otherwise would permit a husband to profit by his own
wrongful or negligent act at the sole expense of the third party.'5
In 1951 Pennsylvania adopted" the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act'6 and repealed its 1939 statute. Though there was some speculation that
this statutory change overruled Pennsylvania's minority position' 7 all doubt
was removed in 1955 when Fisher v. Diehl was reaffirmed by the case of Puller v.
Puller,18 which emphasized the equities involved?'
The Growing Dissent. Though there had been no ruling on the precise question
by the state courts of Maine, that state appeared to stand with the majority until
1963. In 1959 a federal court, in two actions20 involving facts almost identical
to those in Fisher, had denied contribution and held that to enforce contribution
in Maine, common liability by the joint tortfeasors to the injured spouse was
required.2 ' But in Bedell v. Reagan22 Maine joined Pennsylvania and allowed
contribution in another automobile collision case involving interspousal immunity,
despite the fact that under Maine law neither spouse could maintain an action
against the other. The court held that "the instant case is not a single action
but is obviously and in truth two separate causes of action procedurally
combined .. ,,23 The wife was not considered to be a party to the contribution
action.
Despite the legal device employed, the Bedell court's holding rested primarily
upon the equities involved. The court concluded that "'the element of common
15 Id. at 484, 40 A.2d at 917.
16 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 2082-89 (Supp. 1966).
17 In 1952, a federal court, in Zutt v. Blatt, 13 F.R.D. 3 (E.D. Pa. 1952), attempted to
apply Pennsylvania law in the same factual situation, and granted a motion by the defendant
to sever an action by a husband and wife against him on the ground that if both defendants
were found jointly liable for the wife's injuries, contribution could not be had from thehusband under the uniform act. At least one authority commented that this case indicated
that the statutory change overruled Fisher v. Diehl. See Prosser, Torts § 47, at
277 n.73 (3d ed. 1964).
18 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955).
19 The court observed that:
Whatever may be the law in the majority of other jurisdictions, ... it is established
in our own State that a tortfeasor has a right of contribution against a joint tort-
feasor even though the judgment creditor be the latter's spouse, parent, or minor
child; in other words, a tortfeasor may recover such contribution even though, for some
reason, the plaintiff who has obtained a judgment against both of them is precluded
from enforcing liability thereunder against the joint tortfeasor . . . . The theory
is that as between the two tortfeasors the contribution is not a recovery for the tort
but the enforcement of an equitable duty to share liability for the wrong done.
Puller v. Puller, id. at 221, 110 A.2d at 177. [Citations omitted.]20 Reed v. Stone, Jeppsen v. Jaeger, 176 F. Supp. 463 (S.D. Me. 1959).
21 The court cited Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 Atl. 815 (1918). Maine has no
contribution statute and the doctrine as applied there is entirely court-made law.
2 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963).
23 Id. at 294, 192 A.2d at 25.
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liability of both tortfeasors to the injured person' has been suffered to become
a fetish, '24 and that equity should prevent the application of a legal principle
which results in unconscionable and unjustified hardship. It felt that any
marital discord engendered by a contribution suit would be slight and more
tolerable than a denial of contribution.25
Louisiana joined Pennsylvania and Maine in 1965 when it decided Smith v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.,2 6 which also involved interspousal im-
munity as a defense to an action arising from an automobile collision wherein
both drivers were negligent. In so doing, the Louisiana court became the first to
overrule a prior state decision on the question 27
Louisiana classifies joint tortfeasors as "solidary" codebtors in its Civil Code,2 8
and amended the Code in 1960 "to provide a substantive law base for the enforce-
ment of contribution among joint tortfeasors through the third party demand."2 9
A husband's immunity from suit by his wife is also provided for by statute,30
but the court in Smith held that the immunity was merely a procedural bar to the
wife's right to sue the husband, and not a removal of a substantive cause of
action against the husband for negligently injuring his wife. Therefore contribu-
tion could be enforced against the husband based on this existing cause of
action.31 The court expressed concern about the indirect, .adverse effect upon
the marital relationship which might result, but held that such a consideration
was not a basis for extending the application of interspousal immunity.32
24 Id. at 298, 192 A.2d at 27.
25 "It is of the very proper object of equity to prevent application of a universal legal
principal in an eventuality where unconscionable and unjustifiable hardship must otherwise
ensue." Ibid.
[A]n assertion by a husband against his wife of a third-party plaintiff's defenses to
the wife's action would be reliably calculated to engender marital discord but not to
any insuperable degree. Such a regrettable evil must be regarded, however, as more
tolerable than a denial of contribution to the third-party plaintiff in cases such as the
one at bar.
Id. at 299-300, 192 A.2d at 28.
26 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965).
27 Johnson v. Housing Authority, 163 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 1964).
28 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2103 (West 1952). A solidary obligation exists when one of
several obligors is separately bound to perform the whole of the obligation. La. Civ. Code
Ann. art. 2082 (West 1952).
29 Explanatory Note-Henry G. McMahon, La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2103 (West Supp.
1965, at 73), amending La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2103 (West 1952).
30 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:291 (1965).
31 In so deciding, the Louisiana court ignored language in Article 2091 of the Civil Code
which might have been construed to require common liability to the plaintiff for contribution
as required in the majority jurisdictions:
There is an obligation in solido on the part of the debtors, when they are all obliged
to the same thing, so that each may be compelled for the whole, and when the pay-
ment which is made by one of them, exonerates the others toward the creditor.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2091 (West 1952).
32 The general tenor of Article 2315, creating a cause of action in favor of injured
parties against those by whose fault the injury happened, makes that article universal
in its operation unless a specific exception is established by law. In view of this funda-
mental premise, and in the absence of an appropriate exception, it follows that a
substantive cause of action would come into being in favor of an injured wife against
a negligent husband. The immunity created by LSA-R.S. 9:291 is not an exception to
the creation of this substantive cause of action; it is merely a procedural bar to the
wife's right to sue the husband personally.
Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 703, 174 So. 2d 122, 125 (1965).
The indirect, adverse effect upon the marital relationship which might result . . .
[concerns us but is not] a basis for extending the application of LSA-R.S. 9:291 beyond
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Rhode Island Joins the "Minority." A collision between an automobile driven
by the agent of Esther Zarrella and one driven by Jacob Miller caused injury to
Mr. Miller's wife, a passenger in his car. Both drivers were negligent. Mrs.
Miller brought suit against Mrs. Zarrella to recover for her injuries and a settle-
ment was reached. In a subsequent action, Zarrella v. Miller,3 3 the defendant
in the first action sought contribution from Mr. Miller under Rhode Island's
contribution statute.3 4 Mr. Miller raised the defense of interspousal immunity,
claiming that, since he was immune from a direct action by his wife to recover
for her injuries, he was not "liable in tort" as required by Rhode Island's
statute.s5 The court rejected this argument and allowed contribution, ruling that
"liable in tort" referred to culpability. "Liable," it said, referred "to the existence
of a cause of action rather than the right to enforce the same and... under our
law the immunity of one spouse from suit by the other is merely procedural."3 6
But the court went further:
The considerations of public policy upon which the doctrine of interspousal
immunity is predicated do not apply to actions for contribution under the
act since such actions do not contemplate an action by a wife against her
husband. The reason of the rule against interspousal suits does not apply
to actions under the instant act.3 7
Until Rhode Island's decision in Zarrella, no state which had adopted the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act33 had held contrary to the majority
rule, except Pennsylvania, which had a state policy favoring contribution even
before it passed the Uniform Act.39
Evaluation of the Minority Decisions. Denying contribution from plaintiff's
negligent spouse places an unfair share of the burden of loss on the third-party
tortfeasor by allowing the defense of interspousal immunity to be raised against
a person other than a spouse. Such a result is contrary to the trend toward
limiting that defense,40 and it ignores the fact that the primary policy sought to
be implemented by the defense, the preservation of domestic harmony, is not
violated by permitting contribution. The financial burden imposed on the family,
by cutting in half its award from the third-party tortfeasor, is justly imposed
because the family unit was as negligent as the third party. Under the common
its clear import-the incapacity of the wife to sue her husband for damages being
purely procedural and definitely limited to a suit between spouses.
Id. at 706-07, 174 So. 2d at 126.
33 217 A.2d 673 (R.I. 1966).
34 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 10-6-1 to 10-6-11 (1956).
35 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 10-6-2 (1956), which defines joint tortfeasors as "two or more
persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person ....
36 Zarrella v. Miller, 217 A.2d 673, 675 (RI. 1966).
87 Ibid.
-3 See note 7 supra.
39 See text accompanying notes 12-19 supra. The section of the act on uniformity of con-
struction provides: "This Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its gen-
eral purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it." Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act § 9. Both Pennsylvania (Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2088 (Supp. 1965))
and Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 10-6-10 (1956), substituting the word "chapter"
for "Act") adopted this section. It is generally held that the Commissioners' notes, while not
binding with respect to interpretation, are highly persuasive and should be adopted unless
clearly erroneous or contrary to the settled policy of the state. E.g., Shultz v. Young, 205
Ark. 533, 538, 169 S.W.2d 648, 651 (1943).
40 See Prosser, Torts § 116 (3d ed. 1964).
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law, the negligence of one spouse would have been imputed to the other and
would have acted as a total bar to recovery.4 1
But there are defenses which should be maintained in contribution actions as
well as in direct actions. The minority jurisdictions which have allowed con-
tribution despite the defense of interspousal immunity have gone too far if their
decisions allow contribution without regard to the defense involved. Each defense
must be individually considered.
Pennsylvania and Louisiana have already made distinctions or contrary rulings
with respect to workmen's compensation, 42 and Pennsylvania decisions in related
areas indicate that different policy considerations should govern each defense
pleaded.43 Pennsylvania and Maine have emphasized equity, and an equitable
doctrine is by its very nature more flexible than a rule of law. Louisiana and
Rhode Island have emphasized the difference between substantive and procedural
bars. Louisiana decisions indicate that the nature of the individual defense will
govern. In contrast, Rhode Island's emphasis on the mere existence of a cause of
action as sufficient to make a defendant liable under its contribution statute may
well lead to unfortunate results.44
Other Special Defenses
Most other defenses involve policies which would be directly violated if the
defenses were not recognized to prevent contribution. Thus, where charitable
immunity is still recognized, it should be upheld as a defense to a contribution
suit, since allowing contribution would violate the primary policy behind the
immunity-preservation of the charitable trust fund.45 Similarly, governmental
immunity should be upheld when allowance of contribution claims would violate
the policy against the dissipation of public funds which underlies the immunity.46
Contributory Negligence. It is generally held that the defense of contributory
negligence is a defendant's substantive right, and in order to abolish it a statute
must declare the abolition in express terms, not merely set forth grounds of
41 E.g., McFadden v. Santa Ana, 0. & T. Ry., 87 Cal. 464, 25 Pac. 681 (1891).
42 See notes 66-70 infra and accompanying text.
43 See Union Paving Co. v. Thomas, 9 F.R.D. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1949), where the court said
that in Pennsylvania contribution is allowable except when it would be inequitable. Pennsyl-
vania courts have also held, in ignoring the defense of interspousal immunity, that "when
the policy behind a rule no longer exists, the rule should disappear." Kaczorowski v. Kal-
kosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 444, 184 Ad. 663, 665 (1936).
44 The original Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939 is in effect in both
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. Construing this statute, which defines joint tortfeasors as
"two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury" (Uniform Act
§ 1, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2082 (Supp. 1965), R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 10-6-2 (1956)) and
which provides that "the right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors" (Uniform Act
§ 2(1), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2083,(1) (Supp. 1965), R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 10-6-3
(1956)), the majority jurisdictions hold that the requisite liability is not present if a tort-
feasor has a valid defense against an action by the injured party, Pennsylvania holds that
the particular defense involved determines whether or not there is liability, and Rhode Island
holds that the required liability is present whenever the injured party has a cause of action
against a tortfeasor, even if it cannot be enforced because of a defense enjoyed by the tort-
feasor. The 1955 revised Uniform Act (see note 7 supra) was intended to reconcile the
variations among the states. Among the changes made was the elimination of the term
"joint tortfeasors." However, neither Rhode Island nor Pennsylvania has adopted the revised
act.
45 Cf. Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328 (1951).
46 Cf. Oahu Ry. & Land Co. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 707 (D.C. Hawaii 1947).
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liability which appear to exclude contributory negligence as a defense.4" In the
case of workmen's compensation statutes and the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, contributory negligence is expressly excluded as a defense for the employer.48
If injury to an employee is caused by the employer and a third party as joint
tortfeasors, and the employee is contributorily negligent, the third party has
a defense but the employer remains liable. The employer should not be able to
obtain contribution from the third party and thereby deprive him of his defense,
since the reasons for allowing the defense have not been undermined.4 9 The
employee's contributory negligence bars him from recovering ordinary tort
damages. The amount he can recover from his employer under a workmen's
compensation law is limited by statute.50
A plaintiff may also be contributorily negligent toward one defendant but not
the other.51 In this case there is less reason for denying contribution than there
is when the joint tortfeasors are subject to different tests for liability and different
measures of damages because of a workmen's compensation statute. Contributory
negligence is a bar to recovery by a plaintiff because his actions make him as
culpable as the defendant. As between the joint tortfeasors, there is no difference
in culpability even though the plaintiff was contributorily negligent toward only
one of them. As plaintiff will recover damages from one tortfeasor regardless of
whether contribution is allowed, the reason for the defense is gone and contribu-
tion should be allowed. Whether contribution is allowed, however, depends on
whether the contribution statute is construed to have eliminated contributory
negligence by the plaintiff as a defense in this situation. It is unlikely that this
will ever happen, since courts are extremely reluctant to eliminate any defense
and the defense of contributory negligence is considered to be a defendant's
substantive right.
Assumption of Risk. When a plaintiff expressly "assumes the risk" 52 of a
defendant's actions, or such assumption of risk is clearly implied, the plaintiff
cannot recover. 53 But the duty of other defendants in this situation is in no way
altered, and they should be fully liable for their torts. The defendant who has
breached no duty, even though he would be a joint tortfeasor had there been no
assumption of risk, should not be forced to share in this liability.54
47 See, e.g., Lowe v. Southern R.R., 85 S.C. 363, 367-68, 67 S.E. 460, 462 (1910); Du
Rocher v. Teutonia Motor Car Co., 188 Wis. 208, 205 N.W. 921 (1925).
48 Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, contributory negligence only mitigates
damages. 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1964).
49 See Kennedy v. Pennsylvania R.R., 282 F.2d 705 (3d Cir. 1960) ; Panichella v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 167 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1958); Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 268 Wis. 6, 66 N.W.2d 697 (1954).
50 This limitation of liability is also protected. See notes 63-70 infra and accompanying
text.51 For example, P buys a rope from D2 for rigging a scaffold and D2 negligently gives
him a defective rope. P discovers the defect and therefore buys another rope from Di which,
unknown to P, is also defective. D1 is negligent in supplying the second rope. P then raises
the scaffold using both ropes; both break, P falls and is injured. Had either Dl or D2 not
negligently supplied a defective rope, the injury would not have happened. Clearly Di is
liable to P. But P knew of the defect in the rope supplied by D2 and depending on that rope
is contributory negligence by P.
52 See, e.g., Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959);
Restatement (Second), Torts §§ 496A-496G (1965).
53 Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., supra note 52, at 49, 155 A.2d at 93.
54 If plaintiff is playing in a football game and is injured as a result of being tackled by an
opposing player who pushed plaintiff onto a rake negligently left on the field by school
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When the intent to assume risk is not so clearly manifested, assumption of
risk is very similar to contributory negligence, the test of plaintiff's conduct being
the reasonably prudent man.55 In this situation, assumption of risk should be
upheld against contribution when contributory negligence would be upheld
against it.
Statutes of Limitation. If the injured plaintiff brings a successful suit against
one of the joint tortfeasors before the statute of limitations has run, an action
for contribution can generally be maintained by that tortfeasor, even though
the statute would bar an action by the original plaintiff against the other tort-
feasor.56 The statute of limitations applicable to the contribution action does not
begin to run until the first defendant satisfies the judgment against him, since
this is when the cause of action for contribution arises. This view is reinforced by
the theory that a contribution suit is basically quasi-contractual, the payment of
the judgment by the first defendant establishing the quasi-contractual obliga-
tion.57
Statutes of limitation are enacted to allow repose, so that after a certain time
a matter can be considered settled without perpetual concern that it may be
revived and disrupt future events.58 These statutes also ensure that a party will
not be forced to litigate an issue long after evidence concerning it has been
destroyed and witnesses to it have disappeared or have forgotten what tran-
spired.5 9 The procedure above does extend the statutory period beyond its
normal limit, but a definite period after which an action cannot be brought is
still maintained. At the same time, the defendant is ensured of having fair and
adequate time in which to bring his action for contribution.
However, the fact that the statute runs from the date of payment of the judg-
ment rather than from the date the judgment was obtained may work substantial
injustice upon the contribution defendant if there is a long delay between the date
the judgment is obtained and the date it is paid. A delay of many years is possible
if the first defendant is insolvent or successfully evades payment and the plaintiff
continually renews the judgment until it is satisfied. If the negligence of the
contribution defendant has already been determined, the loss of evidence and
reliable witnesses is not a factor. But such long delay is a burden on that de-
fendant and, if the first defendant is responsible for the delay, laches or some
similar doctrine should bar his recovery of contribution, especially as contribution
in itself is an equitable doctrine.60
employees, the school district should certainly not be allowed contribution from the player
who made the tackle. Plaintiff did not assume the risk of the school district's negligence and
its liability is unaffected. But plaintiff, by participating in the football game, did remove the
duty of ordinary care owed him by his opponents, and they should not be liable for injury
resulting from the ordinary dangers of the game.
55 See Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., supra note 52, at 51, 155 A.2d at 94.
But see 38 Am. Jur. "Negligence" § 172 (1941).
56 McKay v. Citizens Rapid Transit Co., 190 Va. 851, 857-58, 59 S.E.2d 121, 123-24
(1950). See also Restatement, Restitution § 86, illustration 3 (1937).
57 Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 336, 77 A.2d 368, 375 (1951). See also
McKay v. Citizens Rapid Transit Co., supra note 56, at 858-59, 59 S.E.2d at 124, holding
that the three year statute of limitations for implied promises rather than the one year
statute for torts should apply.
58 See- Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 617 (1895).
59 Id. at 616-17; Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435, 448 (1918).60 See cases cited in note 1 supra.
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The hardship on the second defendant is especially great if he is unaware
that he may be subject to a suit for contribution long after the judgment against
the first defendant is obtained. But having the limitations period for a contribu-
tion action run from the date of the original judgment, rather than from the date
the judgment is paid, would work injustice on an insolvent first defendant who is
unable to satisfy the judgment before the statute has run. The interests of both
sides might best be protected if the statute were to begin running when the
judgment against the first defendant is obtained, with the first defendant being
allowed to toll the statute until after payment by notifying the second defendant
of his intent to seek contribution when he has satisfied the judgment. The second
defendant would then be alerted to the fact that he might have to defend against
a contribution action. If he were to show that continued delay would be an
inordinate burden on him, the second defendant could be permitted to settle the
matter by means of a declaratory judgment action.
Automobile Guest Statutes. Guest statutes have been adopted by more than
half the states,61 and are designed to relieve the driver of the consequences of
ordinary negligence to his guest. Thus a guest involved in a two-car collision in
which both drivers were merely negligent would have no enforceable cause of
action against his host driver, but he could bring a successful action against the
other driver. That driver would want to obtain contribution from the host.
Guest statutes are usually based upon a theory of assumption of risk by the
guest or upon a desire to protect insurance companies from collusive claims. 2
When the primary policy behind the statute is one of assumption of risk, the
statute should be treated as was the defense of assumption of risk. But when the
primary policy is the prevention of collusive claims, the defense should not be
permitted in a contribution suit. This is because the claim of the guest has already
been established and the only issue which remains is the equitable distribution
of the burden of that claim.
Workmen's Compensation Laws. When workmen's compensation laws are
raised as a defense to a contribution suit, there are again two strong equitable or
policy considerations. The employer whose liability to his employee is absolute,
but limited in amount, should not be subjected to unlimited liability for his
common-law torts merely because a third party is also liable to the employee.
A rule allowing contribution would also allow an injured employee to recover in-
directly from his employer for injuries concerning which the employer was not
directly liable under the workmen's compensation law. On the other hand, the
third party should not be forced to bear the entire burden of the loss merely
because the other tortfeasor chanced to be the plaintiff's employer; such a situa-
tion forces the third party to subsidize the workmen's compensation system.
The majority of courts in this situation follows the same path taken with other
immunities and denies contribution, reasoning that there is an absence of common
liability, the employer's liability being imposed and limited by the act rather than
by the rules of negligence.63 This seems more just than allowing unlimited
61 See Note, 3 Wyo. L.J. 225 n.2 (1949).
62 See Prosser, Torts § 34, at 190 (3d ed. 1964).
63 A few jurisdictions have gone beyond holding merely that joint liability is required
and have given lengthy consideration to the problems involved. See Iowa Power & Light Co.
v. Abild Constr. Co., 144 N.W.2d 303, 306-11 (Iowa 1966), where the court decided that
any change in the rule ought to be dealt with legislatively but noted the strong arguments
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liability, as in an ordinary tort suit. The reasons for disallowing interspousal suits,
for example, do not appear to be as strong a basis for denying contribution as the
creation of an exclusive statutory remedy under a workmen's compensation act,
which substitutes liability without fault for common-law negligence64 and is
clearly substantive rather than procedural in nature.65
Pennsylvania seems to have found a better rule than absolute denial of con-
tribution. Since the 1940 case of Maio v. Fahs,66 Pennsylvania has allowed
contribution to a joint tortfeasor to the extent of the employer's liability under the
act.67 The formula employed by Maio combines the statutory limitation of
liability with the equitable policy that joint tortfeasors share their liability to
the plaintiff.68
No other state has followed Pennsylvania's limited formula and allowed
contribution to overcome the defense of statutory immunity from ordinary tort
liability where an employer is liable under workmen's compensation. 69 Of the
three other states standing with Pennsylvania in allowing contribution despite
the defense of interspousal imhmunity-Maine, Rhode Island, and Louisiana-
only Louisiana has ruled on the question of workmen's compensation as a defense.
That state, standing this time with the majority, has denied contribution.70
for allowing contribution when one defendant enjoys a special defense against the injured
party. See also justice Becker's opinion concurring in the result but dissenting on the ques-
tion considered here. Id. at 317.
04 See Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., supra note 63, at 306-11.
65 Ibid.
66 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940).
67 Id. at 187-92, 14 A.2d at 109-11.
68 In Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 461-62, 155 A.2d 836, 840 (1959), the plaintiff
claimed that Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955), which upheld the ruling in
Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1945), overruled Maio and that full con-
tribution should be allowed (see text accompanying notes 12-19 supra). Despite the broad,
theoretical basis for the Puller decision, it was held that Puller was distinguishable from Maio.
The court said that Puller decided that the public policy aimed at preserving domestic
tranquillity was overcome by that enforcing the joint tortfeasor's statutory and equitable
right to contribution, whereas the applicable statute had eliminated any cause of action for
trespass where workmen's compensations procedures had been substituted. In the latter case
there was no common liability based in tort because the employer was simply not liable in
tort; he retains only the statutory liability.
69 Illinois denies contribution between joint tortfeasors under the common law, except
when one is the primary tortfeasor and the other bears only a passive relationship to the
cause of injury. In such a case contribution is allowed as an adjustment between defendants,
independent and separate of the original tort claim and based on principles of equity, not
tort law. It has been held that the Workmen's Compensation Act in Illinois does not abolish
rights of a party to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor whose relations to
the injured person were governed by the act. Boston v. Old Orchard Business Dist., Inc., 26
Ill. App. 2d 324, 168 N.E.2d 52 (1960).
In admiralty contribution is allowed despite workmen's compensation; see, e.g., The
Tampico, 45 F. Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y. 1942).
70 Palmer v. Willemet-Stouse Elec. Co., 183 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 1966), cert. denied, 184
So. 2d 736 (La. 1966). The Louisiana Court of Appeals previously bad upheld the defense
of no liability under the workmen's compensation law and denied contribution in Sanderson
v. Binnings Constr. Co., 172 So. 2d 721 (La. App. 1965). But just eleven days later the
Supreme Court of Louisiana handed down its decision in Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau
Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965), allowing contribution despite interspousal
immunity and casting doubt on the Sanderson ruling. See text accompanying notes 26-32
supra. A federal court rejected the precise argument that Smith overruled Sanderson in Yale
& Towne Mfg. Co. v. J. Ray McDermott Co., 347 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1965).
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The Effect of Liability Insurance
The role which liability insurance should play in tort law is widely debated, and
it presents particular problems in contribution suits. Primarily, the question is
one of whether the presence of such insurance should alter traditional concepts
of tort liability based on fault and whether consideration should be given to the
ability to pay and redistribute the loss. 71 Unquestionably, "contribution allows
defendants who are strategically placed to distribute the loss over society to
cast it back instead on to the shoulders of individuals who cannot distribute it
at all." 72
The questions presented by the presence of liability insurance are additionally
complicated when one of the joint tortfeasors enjoys a special defense against
direct action by the injured party. Insurance may undermine the policy behind
the defense-as when a charitable trust fund is not diminished because of
insurance protection." Against this stands the proposition that liability insurance
is not supposed to create liability but only to recompense it when it already
exists.
7 4
The presence of insurance may mean that family harmony is not endangered
by an interspousal tort suit, but the danger of a collusive law suit between the
spouses seeking recovery on their insurance provides a further reason for barring
interspousal suits. In Puller v. Puller,75 contribution was allowed despite inter-
family immunity. Mr. Puller carried liability insurance, but the policy provided
that "this policy does not apply .. . to the insured or any member of the
family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured."7 6 The court
held that the insurance company was not liable to pay the contribution award
because such liability would make the policy applicable in contradiction of its
express terms.
The reason for such clauses limiting liability insurance coverage is the obvious
danger of collusion between closely related parties who will both stand to benefit
from recovery on an insurance policy. Insurance companies have also sought to
combat such collusion by including in their policies cooperation clauses requiring
the reasonable aid of the insured in the conduct of suits concerning the policy. 7
States have sought to prevent collusion by statutes specifically limiting the parties
who are covered by an insurance policy when there is liability,78 and by eliminat-
71 See the exchange between Fleming James, Jr. and Charles 0. Gregory in: James, "Con-
tribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1156 (1941);
Gregory, "Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1170 (1941);
James, "Replication," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1178 (1941); Gregory, "Rejoinder," 54 Harv. L. Rev.
1184 (1941).
72 James, "Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism," 54 Harv. L.
Rev. 1156, 1169 (1941).
73 In Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Il. App. 618, 76 N.E.2d 342 (1947), it was held that
protection of a charity's trust fund by insurance destroyed its immunity to suit.
74 See, e.g., Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
75 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955).
78 Id. at 222, 110 A.2d at 177.
77 See State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1939). But see Rozell v.
Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 113, 22 N.E.2d 254, 257 (1939); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566,
576-77, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (1952).
I8 E.g., New York in 1937 simultaneously amended § 57 of the Domestic Relations Law
so as to permit husband and wife to sue each other for torts causing personal injury (N.Y.
Dom. Re]. Law § 57, repealed Sept. 27, 1964; subject matter now covered by N.Y. Gen.
1967] NOTES
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
ing liability altogether when the danger of collusive lawsuits is too great (the
primary example being the institution of automobile guest statutes). But permit-
ting contribution can upset the balance of such a scheme.
When contribution is allowed despite a special defense which a tortfeasor
has against direct action by the injured party, the contribution defendant may
be subjected to liability for injury to a party who, because of the danger of
collusion in a suit by the injured party against the policy holder, is excluded from
coverage under the insurance policy. But the reasons for protecting the insurance
company are not as strong in a contribution action as they are in a direct action.
Though there is obvious hardship in denying protection to a member of the
tortfeasor's family or to his guest, the state has determined that the danger of a
collusive lawsuit against the insurance company is of overriding importance. This
is not so in a contribution suit. The persons between whom collusion is feared-
e.g., husband and wife, driver and guest-are not direct antagonists, and recovery
by the injured party in a direct action against the third party must be assured
before the third party has any claim for contribution. Here insurance protection
should not be denied to the policy holder. While policy coverage may not extend
to the immediate family or some other specifically included class, there seems
to be no reason why it should not extend to include liability as an equitable
duty to a party not so excluded-the joint tortfeasor.
CONCLUSION
The majority view that there can be no contribution among joint tortfeasors
unless there is common liability to the plaintiff should be abandoned, but some
alternative limitation to indiscriminate allowance of contribution must be imposed.
The determinative factor should be the particular defense involved. When one
tortfeasor has a defense against the plaintiff, he should be allowed to raise it
against his co-tortfeasor to bar contribution only when the policy reasons under-
lying the defense to a suit by the plaintiff apply equally well to an action for
contribution. Though uncertainty in the law might result from this approach
before a state rules on the status of a particular defense, this is not of major
concern. The torts which involve contribution do not normally involve premedi-
tated action, and, in any event, the presence of a defense should never serve as
a motivation for wrongdoing.
William B. Rozell*
Obligations Law § 3-313 (McKinney 1964)), and added a provision to § 167(3) of the
Insurance Law which excludes death or injury to spouse and damage to the spouse's prop-
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provides otherwise (N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(3) (McKinney 1966)).
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